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Digital traces of ‘Twitter revolutions’: Resistance, polarization and surveillance via 
contested images and texts of Occupy Gezi 
Abstract 
Protest movements have recently been ignited by social media and are commonly, and 
somewhat hyperbolically, referred to by mainstream media outlets as ‘Twitter revolutions’. 
This paper points out how social media has been a battleground for disseminating contending 
versions of reality across the world not only during ‘Twitter revolutions’ but also in their 
aftermath. To articulate the enduring impact of popular social movements and examine how 
protestors and governmental supporters contest their meaning and significance over time, the 
paper examines the digital traces of Gezi Park protests (2013) after the mobilization has 
dissipated. The digital traces of the Gezi protests act as critical digital artefacts of contestation 
with actors on both sides (in the case of Turkey, pro and anti-AKP government). These digital 
traces are reanimated by actors on both sides to build support, assert truth claims, foster 
identity/community and/or demand recognition. The paper uses a content and multimodal 
analysis of texts and images on Twitter, shared through popular hashtags on the protests when 
the protests’ alleged leaders faced a trial in 2018 and 2019.  
Keywords: digital traces, Twitter revolutions, polarization, resistance, surveillance, Occupy 
Gezi 
1)Introduction 
Protests unfold in a given time and space, but they live on in symbols, cultural artefacts and 
memories, and can be re-appropriated by protestors and opponents to build political capital. 
Protest movements such as the Arab Spring have been ignited by social media, especially 
Facebook and Twitter, and are commonly referred to as ‘Twitter revolutions’ (see Mozorov, 
2009; Christensen, 2011). The consequences of the early 2010s protests have continued to 
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transform people’s everyday lives, political identities and their social media practices including 
activists and their opponents. As an example, the Gezi protests are still at the forefront of the 
Turkish agenda after six years and social media users continue to engage with the memory, 
iconography and symbols of the protests on a range of digital platforms. This article 
demonstrates how digital traces of texts and images are contested by diverse actors across time 
on social media. Users take advantage of this mutability (Rose, 2016) to present a particular 
narrative or elaborate an argument, which supports a certain worldview. The paper argues that 
the digital traces of the Gezi Park protests act as critical digital artefacts of contestation with 
actors on both sides (pro and anti-AKP government). The article is concerned with how these 
digital traces are not temporary trails which disappear over time but are reanimated by actors 
on both sides to build support, assert truth claims, foster identity/community or demand 
recognition. To preserve traces on digital platforms becomes a critical issue specifically due to 
intensive pressure on internet freedoms, which causes the disappearance of initial traces of the 
protests. 
In examining the digital traces of protests in their aftermath by using a content and 
multimodal discourse analysis of texts and visuals, our research fills a gap in the existing 
literature as most of the previous literature on digital political voice related to social movements 
focus exclusively on the peak of protest activity (see Khondker, 2011; Varnali & Gorgulu, 
2015; author2, 2019). Our research methodology captures the visual and textual expression of 
social movements’ messages when their political expression becomes more latent making it 
easier for an authoritarian state to arrest activists. More specifically, our paper interrogates the 
political discourse in Turkey following the Gezi Park protests, by analyzing texts and images 
shared through popular hashtags and mentions related to the protests when their alleged leaders 
have faced a trial in 2018 and 2019. 
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In this paper, we seek to show how Gezi Park protestors and their opponents imagine 
or reimagine the events of 2013, their legacy and their enduring appeal, not least as a resource 
to galvanize others to act or react in the material or digital spheres. Following Milan (2018: 
509), it is crucial to foreground ‘the role of human agency and meaning-making activities 
through protest. In the context of datafication, likes, shares, check-ins, selfies, and other forms 
of expressivity, interaction, and affectivity on social media are only some of the visible digital 
traces disseminated by users on the Web in an equivalent of virtual footprints.’ Our research 
explores how digital traces are seized, re-animated and re-appropriated for specific 
performative and expressive purposes, namely, to establish meaning, build solidarity, raise 
awareness and deliver hate speech. The article argues that digital traces exist on social media 
as a legacy and testament to the Gezi park protests in 2013, whilst identifying ‘the visual as an 
ongoing site of struggle’ on social media platforms (Doerr, Mattoni & Teune, 2013). 
Interrogating how traces can be protected or re-imagined and the trajectory of online 
traces of protests, the article brings a novel perspective on social media and its relation to 
memory as well as its affinity to social and political change. “Images of protest in the news 
rely on a selective portrayal in the sense that they are usually limited to a few archetypes such 
as the rioter, the picket or the performer” (Doerr, Mattoni & Teune, 2013: xiv). The article goes 
beyond this simplistic presentation of archetypes of actors in protest movements by not only 
looking at the re-appropriation of texts and images on digital geographies in the aftermath of 
the protests, but also capturing how some of the shared visuals and texts are corrupted or fake 
stories that actually were not viral during the peak of the protests. The paper illustrates the ways 
Twitter users contested the meaning and significance of Gezi over time and voiced polarized 
views about the protests, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup in July 2016. During 
this time, the Gezi activists mobilized empathy, togetherness and solidarity by continuously 
taking the Gezi protests as a symbolic reference point, while anti-Gezi protesters mobilized 
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violence, hatred and anger on digital platforms. Gezi activists posted texts and images on 
Twitter to mainly point out that the protests were a leaderless mobilization. The anti-Gezi 
groups, however, displayed instances of how internal and external enemies were at work in 
mobilizing the Gezi protests from above. Using fake images and videos, this group portrayed 
the protestors as ‘dangerous and violent others’ with an aim to support the recent raid of the 
alleged leaders of the Gezi protestors.   
We argue that social media platforms can neither take credit nor blame for single-
handedly transforming social processes or for turning around events. We neither intend to 
applaud the successes of social media nor rally against their insidious affects; the aim here is 
to systematically analyze social media mechanisms as sources of transformation (van Dijck & 
Poell, 2013: 11) and contestation in relation to protest movements and their symbols. This 
article also does not seek to determine whether digital media augments polarization or 
solidarity or not but seeks to uncover how digital media is harnessed by actors seeking to shape 
meaning and engage in consciousness-raising whilst contesting and reanimating the texts and 
images of the protest movements. In this light, the first part of the article introduces the 
background of resistance and polarization in Turkey in relation to the Gezi protests. The 
ensuing section theorizes digital traces to inform the conceptual framework, while the next part 
foregrounds the methodological approach of the research. The following two sections analyze 
digital traces of the protests in the form of discourses and images in 2018 and 2019 when hate 
speech, allegations, contestation and polarization were at a peak in Turkey and across the 
world.  
2)The Gezi protests as a response to rising authoritarianism 
From a historical perspective, the 1980s were marked by the proliferation and mainstreaming 
of radical right-wing parties across the globe, such as Thatcher in the UK, Reagan in the USA 
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and Özal in Turkey, united by their anti-communist and neo-liberal agendas, populist politics 
and ethnic nationalism. In the 2000s, far right parties received large and enduring electoral 
support in Europe including Eastern Europe, such as the Front National (France), the FPÖ 
(Austria), and the Danish People’s Party (Denmark) (Rydgren, 2017: 485). Election legislation 
and party coalitions, levels of immigration and unemployment, gender and education level of 
voters, and dissatisfaction with the functioning of mainstream parties and democratic 
institutions help account for the increasing popularity of far-right parties (Doroshenko, 2018: 
3187) as well as their gradual mainstreaming. Following the 2008 financial crisis, populism 
has made historical electoral advances across the globe, including Trump, Modi, Putin, 
Bolsonaro, Erdogan, Salvini, Orban and Oli with generally xenophobic tendencies combined 
with corporate power (Wallgren et. al, 2020: 178) and increasing use of religious references. 
Like its global counterparts, the populism of the ruling party AKP (the Justice and 
Development Party) is neoliberal, authoritarian, and nationalist in character and in constant 
search for internal and external enemies in order to galvanise supporters (Özçetin, 2019: 942).  
The driving social force of the Gezi protests ‘was the alienation of non-conservative 
citizens (e.g. secularists, liberals, and Alevis) from the authoritarianism of the AKP 
governments (2002-present). This represents a social force opposed to the AKP's construction 
of a new collective identity and political regime—the New Turkey’ (Goksel & Tekdemir, 2018: 
382), which primarily rests on a neo-liberal and Islamist political agenda. The Gezi protests 
initially unfolded as an opposition to the radical urban restructuring programmes and the 
commodification of urban space (Kuymulu, 2013; Karakayali & Yaka, 2014), symbolized by 
the intention of protestors to protect the trees in the Gezi Park as the government intended to 
transform it into a shopping mall and artillery barracks. This reaction turned into a wider 
political mobilization, which opened new and ongoing possibilities in claiming the rights to the 
6 
 
city and media to stand up against growing authoritarianism (author2, 2019a; 2019b; author1, 
2018; 2019).  
‘Approximately 3,600,000 activists participated in protests held in 80 out of 81 
provinces. Moreover, the number of Twitter users in Turkey increased from 1.8M to over 9.5M 
in the first five days of the Gezi protests alone in May 2013’ (Yaman 2014: 21) while over 13 
million tweets were shared with hashtags such as #direngeziparki (#resistgezipark) in the same 
period (Saka, 2019: 33). Political hashtags on social media, specifically on Twitter, came to 
prominence in events such as the 2009 Iran presidential election (#iranelection) (Small, 2011) 
or the protests that constituted the Arab Spring (see Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Khondker, 2011; 
Wolfsfeld et al., 2013: Bruns et al., 2013). Similar to the 2013 protests in Brazil, Bulgaria or 
the umbrella movement in Hong Kong in 2014, social media, especially Twitter, has been 
attributed as one of the main sources of the Gezi uprising (Demirhan, 2014; Hacıyakupoğlu & 
Zhang, 2015; Mercea, Karatas & Bastos, 2017; Saka & Karatas, 2017) and other social 
movements in Turkey in the 2010s that paved the way to the uprising, such as environmental 
activism (Şen & Şen, 2016). Research has also demonstrated how protestors during the Gezi 
protests used images to challenge the government’s representation of the protests as lawless 
thugs and to present a pre-figurative vision of Turkish society which was participatory, open, 
inclusive and democratic (author1, 2020; author2, 2019b).  
The ‘right to the city’ during the protests entailed the right to the media with an aim to 
go beyond the ‘penguin media’1 in Turkey, wherein activists created their own media content 
and used technology as a means for their own ends, which had been the most common and 
crucial features of ‘Twitter Revolutions’ such as the Arab Spring. Citizens turned to social 
                                                          
1 The mainstream media was referred to as ‘the penguin media’ during and after the protests. When millions of 
people protested the government on streets, TV channels such as the CNN Turk chose to showcase 
documentaries on penguins.  
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media networks when it became apparent that mainstream media had been co-opted and was 
untrustworthy, pushing misinformation, propaganda, and lies. Gezi activists attempted to 
challenge the narrative presented by the government, government supporters and mainstream 
media in the government’s support. In the face of the concomitant dismantling of the 
mainstream media, we see the emergence and development of an alternative, critical and 
autonomous new media landscape, which Ataman and Coban (2018) describe as a kind of 
counter-surveillance institution. Digital media in Turkey, especially Twitter and Facebook, 
attracted citizens seeking the truth over events in Gezi Park, the issues of police brutality and 
the erosion of civil liberties. People who wanted a space to discuss events unfolding in Istanbul 
and elsewhere, connected with fellow citizens, expressed solidarity, and built resistance. 
Activists engaged in live historicizing of the park occupation through social media for example 
through image circulation on Twitter, video dissemination on YouTube, discussions on 
Facebook page forums, as well as drone footage, creation of alt-media TV, live streaming and 
documenting events digitally as they unfolded. Trolls and AKP supporters also harnessed social 
media to engage in manipulation, insult and accusation (Bulut and Yoruk, 2017), whilst using 
digital surveillance technologies, which in turn triggers restrictive consequences for citizens 
located in the ranks of Turkey’s opposition (Saka, 2019: 68).  
3)Methodology 
In delineating the complexity of online user engagement, this study poses critical questions on 
the social and cultural dynamics of digital activism by selecting the most popular hashtags in 
the aftermath of the protests when the alleged protest leaders were put on trial. In order to 
examine the textual and visual discourse that digital publics generate through Twitter hashtags 
in this period, we depict the most ubiquitous terms in Tweets following selected hashtags. 
Through tracing these terms, metaphors, narratives, images and categories of social 
representations, we portray how public philosophies informed by the memory of collective 
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action forges its proponents and opponents and hence serve for solidarity, polarization and state 
surveillance. In this study, Twitter was selected as it ‘affords an opportunity to generate broadly 
applicable insights’ (Tafesse & Wien, 2017: 6) as a platform for both textual and visual 
expression. While the majority of existing research on Twitter looks at the peak of political 
events as case studies (see Yardi & Boyd, 2010; Wilson & Dunn, 2011; Ahmed et al., 2017), 
we propose that social movements are constituted of broader cycle of events in their online and 
offline effects, following the conceptual framework of Tarrow (1993). Tarrow’s (1993: 284–
286) concept ‘protest cycles’ imply a sequence of stages in social unrest by producing new or 
transformed symbols and frames of meaning around which subsequent mobilizations take 
place. This study identifies Twitter as a digital geography, arguing that ‘web not only functions 
as a place of freedom of expression and opposition’ (Saka, 2017), but also acts as a competitive 
and performative space where competing views meet, intersect and/or coalesce.  
Both pro-Gezi and anti-Gezi advocates have used a shared set of neutral hashtags e.g., 
#Gezi or #GeziPark as well as common sets of non-neutral hashtags e.g., #DirenGezi 
(#ResistGezi) #GeziyiHatırla (#RememberGezi) #GeziyiUnutma (DontForgetGezi) or 
#GezicilerFransaya (GeziProtestorsGoToFrance). While the pro-governmental camp used 
some of the popular hashtags on the Gezi Protests to villainize the protests/protestors such as 
#GezicilerFransaya (#GeziProtestersGoToFrance), other hashtags such as #GeziyiHatirla 
(#RememberGezi) and #GeziyiUnutma (#DontForgetGezi) became sources for the pro-Gezi 
activists in order to memorize the resistance and its culture following its demise. Similar to the 
Kefaya movement in Egypt, as identified by Lim (2012: 238), the Gezi protest’s becoming 
inactive does not mean that its impact was lost as its creators and opponents ‘continued to 
communicate, deliberate, and spread information online’. To be clear, contestation over the 
meaning of Gezi continued well after the protests dissipated in July 2013. We argue that new 
digital technologies make instant recall possible, hold the promise of endless storage capacities 
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(Askanius, 2012: 16), and afford further opportunities to disseminate fabricated images and 
news, which reworks the memory of the protests. 
In order to collect Gezi-related Tweets between 19-27 November 2018, 23 February-6 
March 2019 and 12-13 May 2019 when Gezi-related hashtags hit Twitter trends for Turkey 
(https://trends24.in/turkey/), we made use of Mozdeh software to download Tweets using 
Twitter’s API. Overall, 6856 Gezi-related Tweets were collected using the hashtags 
#HepimizGezideydik (#WeWereAllAtGeziPark), #GeziyiSavunuyoruz 
(#WeDefendGeziPark) and #GeziYargilanamaz (#GeziCannotGoToTrial). Nearly all the 
Tweets were in Turkish except for a few in English. As one of the authors is a native speaker 
of Turkish, the texts of collected Tweets were examined in Turkish using Excel and Nvivo for 
coding purposes. Only the most popular Tweets were translated into English by the same 
author. While Excel was used for a content analysis of the users’ political opinions related to 
Gezi, Nvivo helped to qualitatively code the data. 69% of the collected Tweets represented pro-
Gezi political opinions, while 22% of Tweets were against the protests. The remaining 8% 
were either unrelated posts like adverts or they were automated and/or meaningless messages 















In addition to circulated texts, the paper analyses the images shared along with the 
hashtags. 327 images shared on these Tweets were collected employing the software 
Webometric Analyst (Thelwall, 2014). We have chosen the most popular Tweets for an in-
depth analysis. Although the most tweeted image may not be the most influential, they became 
the most visible representation of the events in this period. Pictures, portraits, photographs, and 
videos of protest, like media texts, are a key strategy used by protestors to communicate with 
different audiences, sometimes with ambivalent consequences given the complex and 
contentious reception of culturally coded visual frames (Doerr & Milman, 2014: 422). As such, 
the article also uses multimodal discourse analysis to deal with ‘contested’ texts and images 
shared through hashtags and mentions on Twitter.  
Multimodal discourse analysis combines the study of language with other resources 
such as images, gesture and sound (O’Halloran, 2011: 120). Doerr (2014) argues that social 
movement scholars who focus on narrative, discourse, framing, and performance tend to show 
how activists actively construct and mobilize collective memory but that we know much less 
about interactions between multiple layers and forms of remembering stored in images, stories, 
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or performances, or discursive forms. In addition to putting forward political messages, ‘social 
movements produce and evoke images, either as a result of a planned, explicit, and strategic 
effort, or accidentally, in an unintended or undesired manner’ (Doerr, Mattoni & Teune, 2013: 
xii). The use of images in protest is nothing new (Pinney 2004; Reed 2005) but the scale and 
scope of visual images have proliferated through the spread of digital media (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2013). Images in the form of photographs, memes, screen grabs, selfies, and video 
stills, amongst others, have emerged as a common currency for protestors on social media. An 
emerging strand of literature examines visual culture and protest (Memou 2013; Doerr, Mattoni 
and Teune 2013; Rovisco 2017), exploring the power of particular images for protest 
movements (Olesen 2018) and how images help protestors communicate their ideas on social 
media (author1 et al 2019a; Aiello and Parry 2019). Visual images thus emerge as a site of 
struggle over representation (Doerr, Mattoni and Teune 2013) with agency centred on how and 
why protestors, as well as their opponents, use images. The challenge is to develop a rigorous 
and abductive methodological approach which codes and categorises images in a systematic 
manner in order to accommodate this flexible meaning-making and the processes which 
underpins this action. Shared images in our sample represent a planned and strategic effort of 
pro-Gezi and anti-Gezi users to make their political statements. Some of these images distort 
the actual ‘digital traces’ and disseminate pseudo-facts, pseudo-realities and conspiracy 
theories in the same strategic manner.  
4)Digital Traces 
Through our everyday activities on social media, we leave digital footprints or traces behind in 
the form of texts and images, which comprise an archive. A trace can refer to a unit of 
information, an object, or can refer to an action or a process and as such can be described as 
‘fragments of past interactions or activities’ (Reigeluth, 2014: 250). Digital traces capture the 
lingering and residual imprint of previous activity leaving a mark of prior interactions and 
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digital activity. Producing traces is ‘an inevitable by-product – if not an integral part – of 
communicating in the “information society”’ (Reigeluth 2014: 249). These traces are important 
as information, which is why data processing companies and organizations are interested in 
this kind of aggregation (Hepp, Breiter and Friemel 2018: 440).  
However, there is a broader challenge to understand how digital traces are re-
appropriated and re-animated by actors seeking to make claims or to challenge the meaning of 
particular events. Survey evidence shows that dramatic social or political events, such as the 
assassination of Martin Luther King or the attacks in New York City on 9/11, tend to polarize 
attitudes (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). While Yardi and Boyd (2010) were interested in interactions 
between mainstream news sources and Twitter users in relation to polarization, we are 
concerned with popular protests and Twitter users related to current cultural wars in Turkey on 
a mundane level. Digital traces are potential ‘multimodal symbolic artefacts’ (Milner, 2013: 
2359). They are connected to memory work and are the products of the ‘remix culture’ of 
digital media (Bayerl & Syoynov, 2016). These traces help to create narratives about the past 
that avoid nuance thus ‘may concurrently lead to polarized and antagonistic representations of 
the past’ (Smit, Heinrich & Broersma, 2018). Digital traces created by protestors are never 
neutral as they are rendered in a moment of rupture and carry a high potential to foster (future) 
dissent as a historically structured conception of memory and identity. 
A trace is thus not an isolated object, mark or thing, offering us a direct access to the 
social world (Hepp, Breiter and Friemel 2018: 443; Van Dijck 2014). It becomes actualized 
only through the social processes of interpretation, conflict and subjectification (Reigeluth 
2014: 252), while signifying digital artefacts of contestation where meaning, consciousness, 
memory, and world-making collide. It is the interplay of the actors and digital platforms, which 
have the potential to reveal how protestors attribute meaning to protestors after the intense 
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protest action has dissipated through evoking, reanimating or re-appropriating discourses, 
ideas, norms, claims, symbols of the protest movement. Digital traces, once created, do not 
belong to any one actor and can be seized upon, re-appropriated and given new meaning and 
significance by a diverse range of actors. The power to control and mediate the meaning of 
digital traces is a political act with the capacity to build solidarities or augment societal 
polarization or hate. This is partly because social media campaigns during trials of the alleged 
leaders of the Gezi protests were ingrained with negative information and fake news. 
5)Twitter, Occupy Gezi and the traces of ongoing resistance 
Protestors and their opponents engage on digital media through performances of 
communication and commemoration. Milan (2018: 519) demonstrates that ‘digital traces 
‘rematerialize’ the meanings produced by social actors’ and in doing so protestors re-
appropriate digital traces to try and recuperate their perceived agency. Due to increasing 
polarization in Turkey and the AKP government turning the screw of social and political 
freedoms and basic civil rights, including the Internet freedoms, digital traces of the most 
significant popular uprising in recent political history, namely Gezi, has become highly 
contested. Milan (2018: 517) argues that digital traces are narrative builders which turn raw 
data into collective narratives through a process of interpretation and creation on digital media. 
When Gezi Park protestors invoke and re-appropriate the memory of the protests, they engage 
in narrative-building and re-interpretation of the protests on digital platforms. This is acutely 
important and empowering in a context of rising authoritarianism, eroding of civil liberties and 
restrictions on free press, including the imprisonment of journalists (Turkey jails more 
journalists than any other state) and academics. The memory of Gezi Park and ‘Gezi Spirit’ 
becomes a rallying cry for people to re-awaken dormant political agency.  
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With a view to reawaken dormant political agency, the overall narrative of the pro-Gezi 
tweets focuses on first affirming the self-identity of protestors, second seeking recognition of 
others through awareness raising and third critiquing ongoing and rising authoritarianism in 
Turkey. The most crucial shared aspect of the pro-Gezi Tweets was their insistence that the 
Gezi protests were a leaderless uprising that manifested through the participation of millions 
of citizens across Turkey. Eslen-Ziya and Erhart (2015) describe the leadership during the 
protests as a post-heroic and collaborative leadership. In appropriating the digital traces of the 
Gezi protests, the Tweets intended to re-narrate the protests to show that protestors did not go 
out to protest the government upon the call of a specific individual and/or a political 
organization. While the same attitude was a crucial component of the park occupations to show 
the police and other state institutions that it was not a bunch of isolated and opportunistic 
çapulcus (‘looters’) protesting, but millions of ordinary citizens, this trend was the main 
narrative of the digital commemoration in the aftermath of the Gezi protests when their alleged 
leaders have been accused for overthrowing the government in 2018 and 2019. In our sample, 
the most shared Tweet was retweeted 291 times on 12 and 13 May 2019: 
@fikirkulupleri Gezi resistance was not a conspiracy that someone organized behind 
closed doors. It was a popular social movement against the destruction of the AKP 
government. Gezi is the future of Turkey. It cannot be put on trial. #GeziYargılanamaz 
(#GeziCannotBePutOnTrial) 
The Tweet condemns the attempts to ascribe the protests as under the leadership of certain 
individuals that were previously active in NGOs, unions or political organizations. Gezi 
developed without the initiatives of leaders but of communities such as the Taksim Solidarity 
Network, which only functioned as a symbolic initiative in order to negotiate with the governor 
of Istanbul to lessen the police violence or with the government to change its authoritarian 
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policies. ‘Like previous movements, such as the Global Justice, Occupy’s aversion to hierarchy 
and central leadership was accompanied by a rejection of the role of the spokesperson and the 
authority attached to it’ (Kavada, 2015: 881). During the Occupy Wall Street protests, as it was 
the case of the Occupy Gezi, discussions were always open while the workings of the 
movement were intentionally transparent. Notes of working groups were published on the 
internet for any interested party to access (Watkins, 2012: 11). However, like the recent raid of 
the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong (2014) in 2019, the Turkish government also aims to 
blame certain individuals and political organizations and corrupt the traces of the Gezi protests. 
Occurring a year after the Gezi protests, the umbrella movement burst out in order to make 
elections more open and aimed for the stepping down of Hong Kong’s leaders in a similar 
fashion to the Gezi Park. Recently, a Hong Kong court has sentenced the alleged leaders of the 
movement to prison terms of up to 16 months. From a similar perspective, the Turkish 
government, by punishing the Gezi protestors, aims to instill fear among individuals and 
communities that have the potential to voice their dissidence. 
Along with the abovementioned text of the Tweet of Fikir Klupleri, the most shared 




Image I: Crowd at Taksim Square, May 2013 
Image I specifically draws attention to the crowds that populated the Taksim Square. Rather 
than focusing on faces or close-up images of the protest camps, the image shows the united 
square movement on Taksim Square next to the Gezi Park using an extreme long shot of the 
area from potentially a drone over the top of the demolished AKM building. Unlike media 
analysis of text documents, the analysis of images used by activists requires a deeper reflection 
on the meaning of distinct visuals used for specific local protest events (Doerr & Milman, 2014: 
422). The Turkish flag forms the central object of the photo, which consolidates the 
‘unification’ of this flagless movement under an existing flag of the nation. During the protests, 
the protestors commonly used the flags of Kurdish movements, LGBTI+ communities or other 
flags as much as the Turkish flag, which is a proof of the ‘cosmopolitan and inclusive character 
of the Gezi protests’ (author1, 2020). However, the chosen image in these Tweets included a 
Turkish flag in the center, potentially to show that the protestors are not enemies of the state 
and prevent the prosecution of the alleged leaders. Arguably, this image intends to address 
accusations that Gezi protestors were anti-Turkey and/or unpatriotic. 
The second most shared Tweet in our sample was a Tweet by Erkan Bas on the 19th 
November 2018. Bas is currently an MP of the TIP party (Turkish Workers Party) in the 
parliament, whom initially entered the parliament as an MP of the pro-Kurdish party HDP. 
During the Gezi protests, he was detained along with thousands of other protestors and he has 
an ongoing trial about being one of the leaders of the protests. Retweeted 242 times, his Tweet 
aims to show that the Gezi protests were a wider protest movement and that he was not a leader:  
@erkanbas Just because we participated in the Gezi protests, an informant gave the 
police our names. Like we have always said that #WeWereAllAtGeziPark and we are 
proud of it. Four years ago when we restarted our journey, we said ‘my right side rots 
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but my left side is so alive’. We do not have anything to say about the limits of the 
decay today.  
While most important aspect of Bas’ commonly retweeted post was its insistence that the Gezi 
protests included millions of protestors not a few people or leaders, it also aims to show how 
common citizens are divided and became enemies of each other in the atmosphere of fear and 
paranoia created by the AKP government. In many of his speeches, Tayyip Erdogan 
individually addresses the local mayors and officials to inform police or the party (AKP) about 
potential ongoing terrorist activities or traitors. Bas, in this regard, also criticizes the decay and 
destruction created by the AKP government on especially a cultural and everyday domain, 
where ordinary citizens became part and parcel of the wider reach and functioning of the state 
surveillance. 
The second most Tweeted image was of the young people who lost their lives due to 
heavy police violence during the Gezi protests. The seven different versions in these Tweets 
originated from the Gezi martyrs drawing by Faruk Tarınç. 
 
Image II: Gezi martyrs 
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The two-fold aim in using the image II is to highlight the solidarity dynamic within the 
protests whilst informing the public on the ongoing trials of the youth that were killed during 
the protests. As an example, Abdullah Comert’s trial was taking place in May 2019 in Balikesir, 
which is a little city in inner Turkey. Balikesir is a city where inhabitants predominantly vote 
for right wing parties, where not so many activists live and therefore not so many people could 
participate in the trials. In isolating the trials from the wider public, the government aimed for 
the forgetting of the traces of the protests and justify the acts of killers in its re-narration of the 
uprising. ‘Visual images are much more than supplementary material accompanying the 
written message’ (Özcan, 2013: 428). In using Image II of the young people that were killed 
during the protests, the aim was to commemorate the losses visually and therefore create 
‘responsibility’, hope and solidarity across other activists. Along with this image, Abdullah’s 
name (and the common abbreviation of his name Abdocan) was used 128 times to call for the 
trial. The image has become a powerful icon for protestors to remember their dead whilst 
serving to mobilise presence and solidarity in a desperate situation where physical presence 
during the trials was hard. Thus, the dead of the movement call the surviving protestors to help 
their actual and potential prisoners and the visual image shows these young dead people 
joyfully, which is also a powerful symbol of resistance to death and repression. A joyful 
commemoration of loss and death functioned as a reference point for digitally remembering 
the trajectory and legacy of the protest movement.  
 
5)Twitter, Occupy Gezi and the traces of hate and surveillance 
Social media can foster both solidarity and polarization based on the legacy and memory of 
protests. Previous research has shown that Facebook may contribute to depolarization effects 
for people who primarily use the network for news as they encounter pro and counter attitudinal 
messages (Beam, Hutchens & Hmielowski, 2018). However, research has also sought to 
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determine how certain groups in society engage in digital enclaves and use these so-called echo 
chambers to attract more supporters, incite anger and hatred, mobilize against defined 
oppositional actors (typically government, institutions of the state, the media, international 
bodies, regimes, multinational corporations, states, politicians, protestors) as well as more 
ephemeral challenges (including ideologies, ideas, norms, values) (author2 et el., 2019). The 
past was and remains as a site of contestation as actors on all sides of a conflict seek to assert 
authorship over what happened, with an aim to claim the moral high ground and clarify ‘the 
truth’.  
As Bail et al. (2018: 9216) point out, despite the hope that people using digital media 
might be exposed to a variety of sources and angles on political phenomenon, there is a growing 
concern that digital media exacerbate political polarization because of social network 
homophily with people preferring to nurture social network ties to those with similar views to 
their own. In studying 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, Lim (2017: 424) defines 
algorithmic enclaves whereby social media users claim and legitimize their own versions of 
tribal nationalism by excluding equality and justice for others, which deepens divisions among 
social groups in society and amplifies animosity and intolerance against each other. Lee et al. 
(2018) show that in South Korea social media indirectly contributed to polarization through 
increased political engagement with those using social media being pushed toward the 
ideological poles, developing more extreme political attitudes.  
Turkey’s socio-political polarization is invariably attributed to the persistence of ‘echo 
chambers’ which fuel cleavages along ethno-nationalist, class, gender, and religious divides, 
as it is the case in our sample. The well-trodden argument is that people engage solely (or 
primarily) in cycles of consuming and sharing information which reinforce extant political 
ideas, preferences, interests and opinions and deliberately limit their exposure to opposing 
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beliefs. On an almost contradictory perspective to ‘homely’ references considering the protests, 
the pro-governmental groups aimed to vilify their opponents referring to them by caustic labels 
such as ‘baby killers’ or ‘gun grabbers’, while designating them as the responsible agents for 
standing in the way of the changes Turkey seeks. Such vilifying framing (Benford & Hunt, 
1992) of the collective character of an antagonist/opponent functions to demarcate boundaries 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, good and evil, and right and wrong (Van Stekelenburg, 2014: 542). 
Beginning with the caustic labelling of protesters by the then prime-minister Erdoğan during 
the protests, especially with the word ‘çapulcu’ (looter), the Gezi activists have been vilified 
in offline and online spaces. This vilification has continued to inform contemporary Turkish 
cultural fabric and political agenda, especially on social media platforms. The anti-Gezi users 
mainly consists of, first, trolls employed (indirectly) by the government, second, 
representatives of the AKP local branches, municipality leaders or other AKP supporters, third, 
groups that are members of or sympathetic to the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party, 1969-
present), which is the far-right ultranationalist political party that has formed a pact with the 
AKP since 2018. 
While the common narrative of the pro-Gezi users rested on the appropriation of the 
protests as a leaderless and widespread movement without emphasizing or vilifying any of the 
groups that have or have not participated in it, the pro-governmental groups used the same 
hashtag to show that Gezi was a treason, which they framed as similar to the actions of the 
previously separationist Kurdish armed force PKK. Shared 204 times in November 2018, the 
most popular of the anti-Gezi Tweets in our sample aimed to account for the power of the pro-
governmental forces vis-a-vis the Gezi protestors, which also represents the general nationalist 
and patriarchal tendency of this camp:  
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@ObaSiyasi You resisted the TOMA vehicle that only sprayed water, but we resisted 
the tank that shot a fire! You hung PKK’s rags! WE HUNG THE GLORIOUS 
TURKISH FLAG! You consumed alcohol! We performed ablution! You looted the city 
and burnt the cars! We did not even scratch the tank that shot a fire on us! You are sold! 
We are dedicated! #GeziyiSavunuyoruz  
In the narrative of the pro-governmental camp, the Gezi protests not only represented a 
mobilization with leaders, but that this leadership was also depicted as a non-glorious and non-
heroic leadership vis-a-vis the leadership and initiative during the attempted coup of the 15th 
of July 2016. Other than glorifying the struggles against the attempted coup of the AKP, the 
discourses in this popular Tweet glorify Islamic practices and posit the Gezi protestors’ aims 
against the trajectories of Islam. Like the emphasis of the consumption of alcohol on this Tweet, 
many other similar Tweets used photos and texts related to condoms and open relationships as 
an excuse to denigrate the perceived lose morality that was said to characterize the protests. 
Although a variety of Muslim groups also protested the government during the Gezi protests, 
the pro-governmental users produced such narratives to manipulate the digital traces of the 
Gezi protests in such a way that the protests or the protestors were against Islam and the unity 
of the Turkish state. Thus, the common discourses on these texts and images aimed to depict 
millions of protestors as a ‘terrorist’ group.  The fact that this camp consistently uses the pro-
governmental discourses shows the ways in which digital publics have the potential to foster 
official narratives about protest movements. This camp also replied to the Tweets of the 
accused and alleged leaders of the Gezi protests such as Mucella Yapici to denigrate their 
political identities, their political messages as well as the Gezi protests in general.  
The most widely shared image used in anti-Gezi Tweets was Image III. The image 
shows an alleged composition of the Gezi Park protests with people holding the flag of the 
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imprisoned leader of the PKK along with others holding the flag of the founder of the modern 
Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with a text saying ‘Kemalism and PKK hand in hand’. To 
capture the underlying meanings revealed through this image, the image was circulated at a 
time when the CHP2 reclaimed power from AKP in main cities of Turkey in the recent local 
elections in March 2019. Seven different versions of this image were used along with different 
texts including the above Tweet. The image together with the text aims to villainize not only 
the Gezi protests/protestors but also denigrates CHP supporters’ potential pact with the Kurdish 
groups. The image also intends to intentionally pick out the specific communities or individuals 
that have protested by making use of a close-up or a medium shot of the protestors. From a 
broader perspective, the image attempts to insult leaders and councils of the Kemalist party 
CHP in order for the AKP government to reclaim power and to consolidate legitimacy by 
declaring non-supporters of the AKP as terrorists. During this time period, the AKP 
government did not accept the results of the mayoral elections of Istanbul and sought for a 
rerun of the elections. As such, the image disseminates a distorted trace of the protests by using 
a fake event as its basis.  
                                                          
2 The Republican People's Party (1923) is the oldest political party in Turkey, which is a Kemalist, social-




Image III: Anti-Gezi Image 
The second most shared Tweet of this camp used a shorter text and presented a video 
rather than an image, which was not a widespread video during the time of the protests. 
@ruyaselcuk This is for those who say #GeziyiSavunuyoruz :/ TOMA hits and scores 
a goal! 😂😂😂 https://t.co/haZJXDHyUv 162 
Like the most popular Tweet of this camp, this second most popular Tweet also intends to non-
glorify the aims and intentions of the protestors. It also turns the Gezi protests into a masculine 
game of power where the aim is to compete for the most heroic and patrimonial position in the 
hierarchy. The common video shared on these Tweets (represented by the screen-shot images 
IV and V) is a male protestor that challenges and stands by a TOMA vehicle who then is 
exposed to heavy physical violence by the water coming from the vehicle. By using the above 
Tweet, the anti-Gezi users make fun of this protestor with discourses such as ‘gezizekali’ 
(Gezidiot). Along with such discourses, the-anti Gezi camp also used the hashtag 
#HesabiSorulur (#YouWillPaythePrice) to curse and threaten the protestors and the potential 




Images IV and V: TOMA vehicle 
In her research on visual images depicting Muslim women in German media, Özcan (2013: 
428) identifies the analysis of visuals as a source of imaginary contact with different religious 
and ethnic minorities. The video above creates an imaginary contact of the police (representing 
the state) with the general pro-Gezi public, bolstering the idea of the ‘strong state’ vis-à-vis 
‘weak marauders’ and legitimizing state-sponsored violence and surveillance against its own 
populaces. More broadly, the anti-Gezi users employed visuals as a way of securing the 
regime’s stability whilst consolidating the nation state’s aims of securitization. In focusing on 
right-wing visual communication through Twitter, the visuals here show the AKP supporters’ 
claims to truth and authentic patriotism in relation to the ‘history’ of treason to Turkish state 
and ‘gender roles’ of ‘glorified male tank driver’ and the weak/feminized looter (Forchtner & 
Kølvraa, 2017: 254).  
6)Conclusion 
Although it has been years since various ‘Twitter revolutions’ took place, their impact is 
persistent as they may potentially function as resources for future mobilizations whilst 
impeding the agendas of the far-right governments and mobilizations. The recent arrests of the 
alleged leaders of the Gezi protests in Turkey and the umbrella movement in Hong Kong 
exemplify these tendencies across the globe for the prevention of left-wing and widespread 
protest movements. While divisive societies form the existing networks of political 
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communities today on a global scale, the ways these divisive societies function and the ways 
images and texts of social movements are contested on digital platforms contribute to an 
understanding of the ways different communities use digital platforms for political expression. 
The political discourses and accompanying images and videos of activists and their opponents 
highlight the movement dynamics that these groups seek in the era of authoritarianism. Digital 
traces of the Gezi protests foster (future) dissent as a historically structured conception of 
memory and identity in the sense that the Gezi activists adhered to the non-heroic leadership 
practices that have emerged during the protests whilst using a less radical trajectory following 
the protests, in order to keep activists safe from state scrutiny and surveillance (i.e. using an 
image with a Turkish flag). On the other hand, the anti-Gezi users share fake images and 
unpopular videos from the protests to target and denigrate the protests and to support the 
government in their prosecution of the alleged leaders. 
In engaging with the digital traces of popular social movements, in this case the Occupy 
Gezi, the article highlights how the activists or the pro-Gezi communities continued to use the 
Gezi protests as a reference point to raise consciousness about non-heroic and collaborative 
social and political change in the face of the other parties’ efforts to villainize not only the Gezi 
protests and the protestors but also the newer ones that may arise today. The paper pointed out 
that intensive pressures on Internet and decreasing overall media freedoms cause the 
disappearance of the initial traces of the Gezi protests. The visual and discursive traces of toxic 
masculinity, nationalism and religious fundamentalism attached to hashtags on Twitter account 
for the ways the pro-governmental sources aim to shadow, isolate and alienate the leaderless, 
multiple and diverse characteristics of the crowds that have composed the movements although 
pro-Gezi users also resorted to nation state symbols such as the Turkish flag. Overall, the article 
shows that at a time when populist movements are on the rise globally, a conceptualization of 
‘digital traces’ of widespread social movements contributes to research in digital media and 
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political engagement, by showing ongoing strategies and tactics in disseminating the political 
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